When Alfred Tarski wrote his famous definition of truth [18] (1933) for a formal language, he had several stated aims. His chief aim was to define truth of sentences. Giving correct meanings of other expressions of the language was nowhere in his list of aims at all; it was a happy accident that a general semantics fell out of his truth definition.
(1) Es genügt, wenn der Satz als Ganzes einen Sinn hat; dadurch erhalten auch seine Theile ihren Inhalt. (It is enough if the sentence as a whole has a meaning; it is this that confers on its parts also their content.) I shall take Frege's statement at face value as a recipe for finding expression meanings from sentence meanings (up to synonymy). The resulting expression meanings are what I shall call the fregean cover of the sentence meanings.
I shall assume that we are discussing a language L, and that it is determinate what the (grammatical) expressions of L are, and when an expression occurs as a constituent of another expression. (Frege's Dictum refers to constituents as 'parts'.) Every expression is a constituent of itself, and every word in an expression is a constituent of the expression. Every expression is a finite string of words. For an easy life we can suppose that when an expression e occurs as a constituent of another expression f , e consists of one or more consecutive words from f ; though I am not sure that anything below really needs this.
Following Frege I shall assume that a particular class of expressions is picked out as fundamental; Frege says 'sentences', but for greater generality I shall call the selected expressions the target expressions. Still following Frege, I shall assume that each target expression e has a meaning µ(e); here µ is a function whose domain is the set of target expressions.
Frege's Dictum assumes also that every expression e has a content ν(e) (where ν is a function whose domain is the set of all expressions). At the time of the Grundlagen Frege had not yet distinguished between Sinn, Inhalt and Bedeutung, and it is probably safe to read Sinn and Inhalt (meaning and content) as the same thing. In that case Frege is also assuming that µ(e) = ν(e) for every target expression, in other words that ν is an extension of µ to the set of all expressions. But again for greater generality I won't assume that until the end of this section.
Frege's Dictum says that for every expression e, ν(e) is determined by the restriction of µ to the set of target expressions containing e. Taken in isolation, the Dictum says nothing at all about how the one determines the other. But even in isolation it does surely imply the following: (2) If expressions e and f have different contents, then there must be a target expression containing one of them, say e, which doesn't go over into a target expression of the same meaning when we replace some occurrence of e in it by f .
Strictly we can't deduce the converse. It's consistent with the letter of Frege's Dictum that, for example, ν(e) = µ(e) for all target expressions e and ν(e) is the Mandelbrot set for all other e. But to make Frege's Dictum interesting, we need a better idea than this. If we are not to import irrelevances, the natural gloss is to ask for ν to make as many distinctions as possible, subject to condition (2) above.
So our task is to define the relation ν(e) = ν(f ) in a way which expresses that e and f make the same contribution to the meanings of target expressions containing them. We note that this relation must be an equivalence relation on the set of all expressions. I shall write ≡ ν for the equivalence relation of 'having the same ν-value'; and likewise with µ.
In fact there seems to be just one reasonable way of doing this. Namely we define: for every target expression s(e) containing e as a constituent as shown, there is a target expression s(f ) got by replacing this constituent by f , and µ(s(e)) = µ(s(f )); and likewise with e, f transposed.
I leave it to the reader to check that this defines an equivalence relation ≡ ν on the class of expressions.
When ν is as in (3), I shall say that ν is a fregean cover of µ. Note that there always is a fregean cover of µ; for example take the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation defined in (3) . Also it is unique in the sense that any two fregean covers agree about whether any given pair of expressions are synonymous (i.e. have the same content). In view of this uniqueness I shall refer to ν as the fregean cover of µ.
Remark 1.
Much of what follows would become pointless if there was some other reasonable way of defining ν. I can't see one. For example you might try defining ν(e) = ν(f ) to be true if and only if whenever s(e) and s(f ) are target expressions that agree except for the substitution of f for e or vice versa, µ(s(e)) = µ(s(f )). This works very badly. Suppose for example that e and f are expressions which can never be substituted for each other in expressions of L. Then the proposed definition says that e and f have the same content! For this and similar reasons, this proposed definition doesn't in general give an equivalence relation.
Or you might try restricting the definition to s(e) and s(f ) where s(f ) comes from s(e) by replacing e everywhere by f , and vice versa. This gives an equivalence relation, but it throws away any information to be gained from target expressions that contain both e and f , which is unreasonable.
No doubt there are other variants. I should be interested to hear of any serious alternative to (3) that doesn't invoke other kinds of structure on the language L.
Remark 2.
We have surreptitiously added one item to the assumptions about L, by assuming we know how to substitute one expression for another inside a third expression. This could just be substitution of strings, in which case the assumption is trivial. But nothing changes if we allow more savvy kinds of substitution. For example we might allow ourselves to know that when you put 'I' for 'He' in He loves her. the result is I love her. Here I note a remark of Peter Ramus (quoted on p. 335 of [15] ):
(4) It's incredible but true . . . that there have been lecturers in [the University of Paris] who clenched their teeth and insisted that I loves is just as correct speech as I love . . . The theory that Ramus attacks here was probably that 'love' and 'loves' mean the same thing and the difference between them is purely syntactic.
In any case we shall assume that an allowed substitution never affects the structure of constituents that don't overlap with the substituted expression, even though it may alter the forms of individual constituents. Proof. By making one substitution at a time we reduce to the case n = 1. We must show that if r(e) is a expression then so is r(f ) and ν(r(e)) = ν(r(f )). By Cofinality there is a target expression t(r(e)), which has e as a constituent by Closure under Subterms. Then by considering t (e) = t(r(e)), we deduce from ν(e) = ν(f ) that t (f ) is a target expression, and so again by Closure under Subterms r(f ) is a expression. Then a similar argument shows that ν(r(e)) = ν(r(f )). ✷ We say that ν is an extension of µ if for all target expressions e, f ,
Right to left holds always, by Proposition 1. The fregean cover of µ is called the fregean extension of µ if it's an extension of µ. Proof. This is just unpacking the definition of ν. ✷ Example One. Let µ be the standard Tarski semantics for first-order logic, but restricted to sentences. (Then µ(φ) = µ(ψ) if and only if φ and ψ are logically equivalent.) The full Tarski first-order semantics (which assigns to each formula and structure the class of all assignments satisfying the formula in the structure) is the fregean extension of µ if we arrange that the meaning of each formula includes the information what variables are free in the formula.
Example Two. Jaakko Hintikka devised a linear notation (called IF for 'independence friendly') for branching quantifiers. In [8] p. 371 Hintikka and Sandu claim that there can't be a compositional semantics for IF that is as 'fine grained' (i.e. roughly, makes as many distinctions) as the standard game semantics.
The problem here is to find a semantics that extends to all formulas of IF the game semantics µ on sentences. Since the condition of Proposition 3 holds for IF, µ has a fregean extension, which is automatically compositional by Proposition 2. In [10] I described such an extension explicitly.
Example Three. W. Zadrozny [20] published a proof that every semantics is 'equivalent to' a compositional semantics. People objected that he had a strange and undefined notion of 'equivalent to'.
A recent unpublished reply of Lappin and Zadrozny [13] says, in our terminology, that every semantics defined on all expressions has a fregean cover. One can read this off from (3) above by taking all expressions to be target expressions. (Zadrozny shows more for the languages he considers, using non-well-founded sets.) Dag Westerståhl (unpublished) has some information about analogues of the fregean extension that exist when the conditions on L and µ are relaxed. §2. The husserlian level. We consider the following equivalence relation ∼ on expressions:
e ∼ f if and only if for every expression s(e), s(f ) is also an expression, and vice versa. A semantics ν defined on all expressions of L is said to be husserlian (for reasons that will follow shortly) if whenever e and f are expressions with e ≡ ν f , then e ∼ f . These notions are important for us because of the following, which one can extract easily from the proof of Proposition 2:
Corollary 4 (The husserlian property). If ν is a fregean cover, then ν is husserlian. So Frege's Dictum forces us to consider husserlian semantics. (Recall Remark 2 above. The Parisian scholars that Ramus attacked seem to have had a non-husserlian semantics for Latin, unless they were also sophisticated about substitutions.)
For future reference I state here another property of ∼. It implicitly uses the assumption that if r(e 1 , . . . , e n ) is an expression and f 1 can be substituted for e 1 in it, then the expression resulting from the substitution is r(f 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ); in other words, substitution never affects the parsing of constituents that don't overlap the substituted expression. (Again recall Remark 2 above.)
. . , e n ) is an expression and for each
It seems that Husserl was the first person to call attention to the equivalence relation ∼, in his Fourth Logical Investigation [12] . In §10 of this Investigation he offers the name Semantic Category (Bedeutungskategorie) for the equivalence classes of the relation ∼. He gives 'Dieser Baum' and 'Dieses Gold' as examples of two expressions in the same category, and he calls this category 'nominale Materie'. He is well aware that in order to get the machinery of categories to work, we may have to allow substitutions to make mechanical changes in the context, for example modifying case endings (his §13, see my Remark 2 again).
Interestingly, Husserl comes to this equivalence relation by first looking at substitutions in target expressions, just as we did. His target expressions are those whose meaning is 'selbständig', i.e. constitutes 'die volle und ganze Bedeutung eines konkreten Bedeutungsaktes' (the full and complete meaning of a concrete act of meaning, §7). Readers of Frege will assume that Husserl means sentences; but he doesn't. For example in the next section he describes 'Röte' (redness) as a word whose meaning is selbständig. We note that the notion of a 'full and complete meaning' is useless for explanatory purposes.
Husserl argues ( §13 for example) that there are 'Gesetze der Bedeutungsverknüpfung' (laws of combination of meanings) that determine what categories of phrases can be combined. In fact this is a mathematical consequence of our definitions and assumptions. Each compound expression e 0 is a concatenation of other expressions, say e 0 = e 1 . . . e n (for example, taking e 1 , . . . , e n to be the words of e 0 in order). Write cat(f ) for the category of f . Then we claim that any concatenation of expressions of categories
respectively is an expression of category cat(e 0 ). This follows at once from Proposition 5. So L satisfies a context-free grammar rule
The set of these rules, together with lexical rules C ⇒ e wherever e is a word and C is cat(e), determines the language L.
Husserl illustrates his 'laws of combination of meaning' with the example ( §13):
noun-meaning + adjective-meaning gives noun-meaning, as for example 'rotes' and 'Haus' gives 'rotes Haus'. Disappointingly he gets the two terms in the wrong order. This warns us that for Husserl the category structure all lies at the level of meaning, and he is not too interested in the accidental ways it may show up in any particular language.
The fact that L has a context-free grammar is less significant than it might seem, because we placed no restriction on the number or length of the context-free rules. Husserl ( §13) sees it as one of the jobs of a 'science of meanings' to reduce the rules to as small a number as possible. He seems to assume the number is finite. In fact he lays great emphasis on the infinity of the set of meaningful expressions, and it is hard to see why he does this unless he wants to stress that his theory explains how we can use finite means to answer infinitely many questions. By the middle of the twentieth century, Husserl's category idea-no doubt rediscovered by several other people-lay close to the heart of the movement called structural linguistics. It was widely agreed that the idea doesn't work as it stands. Thus Zellig Harris [7] , who refers to the contexts in which a word is allowed as the 'co-occurrents' of the word:
On the other hand, to describe a language in terms of the cooccurrences of the individual morphemes is virtually impossible: almost each morpheme has a unique set of co-occurrents; the set varies with individual speakers and with time . . . ; it is in general impossible to obtain a complete list of co-occurrents for any morpheme; and in many cases a speaker is uncertain whether or not he would include some given morpheme as a co-occurrent of some other one. So the structuralists made various adjustments that need not concern us here. For us it is more important to note that we needed the relation ∼ in order to cash in Frege's Dictum. Hence Harris's arguments against the usability of ∼ are indirectly arguments against the usability of Frege's Dictum too. §3. Tarski's view. Harris's arguments stand as a warning against trying to use category analysis naively on natural languages. But none of his arguments apply to the formal languages of logic.
Alfred Tarski, in §4 'The concept of true sentence in languages of finite order' of his paper on the definability of truth [18] 
In writing the present article I had in mind only formalized languages possessing a structure which is in harmony with the theory of semantical categories and especially with its basic principles. . . . Today I can no longer defend decisively the view I then took of this question. In connexion with this it now seems to me interesting and important to inquire what the consequence would be for the basic problems of the present work if we included in the field under consideration formalized languages for which the fundamental principles of the theory of semantical categories no longer hold. Unfortunately Tarski's remarks had the opposite effect to what he intended. Instead of meditating on the 'interesting and important' question of how one might relax those 'fundamental principles of the theory of semantical categories', most readers of Tarski's paper have simply labelled the relevant section §4 as obsolete and skipped it. (At this point in my talk it was heart-warming to hear Per Martin-Löf muttering 'It's the best section'.)
One of Tarski's first moves in this section §4 is to describe a typical language L. He is rather explicit about its construction. From our point of view it will be convenient to state what he does more abstractly, and split it into two conditions. The first is that the language L must have unique parsing:
[Unique Parsing Principle] If two constituents of an expression overlap, then one is a constituent of the other.
The constituents of an expression are always partially ordered by inclusion. The Unique Parsing Principle says that if two constituents have a common lower bound in this partial ordering, then they are comparable; in other words the partial ordering is a tree branching downwards. This tree gives the unique complete parsing.
One consequence is that the language L has a canonical context-free grammar. Its rules for compound expressions e have at the left the category of e and on the right the categories of the expressions immediately below e in the tree. Unfortunately it is not the context-free grammar that we get from the semantic categories, taking Sentence as a semantic category. The reason is that if two formulas φ and ψ have different free variables, then replacing one by the other in a suitable sentence yields a formula that is not a sentence. So there are infinitely many different categories of formula, one for each finite set of free variables. In what follows I use this more complicated context-free grammar, which is a refinement of the simpler purely grammatical one.
The second condition needs some preliminary definitions. We say that a context-free grammar rule is branching if the list of categories on the righthand side of its arrow has length at least two. We say that the language L has a head system if the categories of L are partitioned into two sets, heads and non-heads, so that 1. In each branching rule, exactly one of the categories on the righthand side is a head category; 2. if a head category occurs on the righthand side of a rule, then that rule is branching. We shall say that an expression is a head expression if its category is a head category. Our construction of the context-free grammar from the categories implies clause 2, so clause 1 is the significant one.
If H 1 is a head category which occurs on the righthand side of a contextfree rule which has a head category H 2 on the lefthand side, we record this by writing H 1 H 2 . We say that the head system is well-founded if there is no infinite descending sequence
and flat if the relation is empty. If no head expression is compound then the head system is flat. If the head system is flat then it is well-founded. Tarski's construction of L ensures that [Head Principle] The language L has a head system in which no head expression is compound. The head expressions are symbols for what Tarski calls 'the fundamental operations on expressions by means of which composite expressions are formed from simpler ones' (his italics). Strictly I am assuming here (as Tarski seems to) that quantifiers are indecomposable grammatical units; if we could separate off the quantifier symbol from the variable, the head system would still be well-founded though it wouldn't be flat.
The existence of a well-founded head system has a dramatic impact on fregean covers. Suppose ν is a semantics defined on all the expressions of the language L, and L has a head system. For any category C we write ν [C] for the set of all ν(e) as e ranges through C. We shall say that ν respects the head system if the following holds: For each head category H and each expression h of category H, ν(h) is the following set of ordered pairs R, F : the items R are the context-free rules with H on the right, and for each such rule R, say In Tarski's case, since formulas with different free variables are in different categories, the head expression ∧ (conjunction) stands on the right of infinitely many different context-free rules. This illustrates why we had to take ν(h) as a set of pairs. But the next proposition is not limited to Tarski's languages.
Proposition 6. Suppose the language L has a well-founded head system and µ is a meaning function defined on the target expressions of L.
Then µ has a fregean cover which respects the head system. If the head system is not flat, then this construction needs a repair since c above may be a head expression. The repair is to define the functions ν (h) by induction on the field of the relation , starting with those h whose category is not any category. At later stages in the induction, if cat(h) cat(c) in the definition of F above, then by induction hypothesis we can assume ν (c) has already been defined, and we use
for the definition of F .
We have to show that ν and ν make exactly the same distinctions. All distinctions involving non-head expressions remain as they were before. If g, h are of different categories, then ν (g) = ν (h), but also g ∼ h and so ν(g) = ν(h) since ν is husserlian. Finally suppose g and h are in the same head category H, and suppose for simplicity that H has the one context-free rule
Then by two applications of Proposition 2, ν(g) = ν(h) if and only if for all expressions d i of category D i (i ≥ 1), ν(gd 1 . . . d n ) = ν(hd 1 . . . d n ) .
(From right to left, use the definition of the fregean cover and the fact that g and h are occur only in expressions of this form.) But this is equivalent to ν (g) = ν (h). ✷ After defining his object languages, Tarski turns to semantic categories. One of his guiding ideas is that if two expressions are of the same category, then their contents should have a similar category structure. The formulation I have just given is only slightly less precise than Tarski's own ( [18] p. 219). But for example, if e and f are of the same category and the content of e is a set of ordered pairs of contents of expressions of category C, then the content of f should also be a set of ordered pairs of contents of expressions of category C. This is a sound heuristic principle. But it easily suggests the following reasoning, which is fallacious. Suppose we consider a typical fully interpreted language L (for example let L be a logical language interpreted in a structure). Then the meaning of an expression R(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ), where R is an n-ary relation symbol, is a set of ordered n-tuples of individuals. A formula φ(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ), whose free variables are exactly those shown, has the same category as the formula R(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ), hence its meaning should likewise be a set of ordered n-tuples of individuals. The reasoning is fallacious because logics with quantifiers of imperfect information (e.g. Hodges [9] ) are counterexamples. Inspecting these cases, we see that adding the quantifiers of imperfect information bumps up the set-theoretic type of the meanings of formulas φ(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ) in general. So if we want to follow Tarski's heuristic, we have to encode the meaning of R(v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ) as an object of higher type too.
Tarski states a 'first principle of the theory of semantical categories' that seems to translate to our setting as follows: [Tarski' s First Principle, [18] p. 216] If there is an expression s(e) which is not equal to e, and s(f ) is also an expression, with s(e) ∼ s(f ), then e ∼ f .
Unfortunately in [9] I stated this without the clause 'with s(e) ∼ s(f )'; I thank Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska for picking this up. My comments in [9] , in particular the counterexamples in English, all refer to the corrected version above. It is not clear to me why Tarski considers the First Principle natural 'from the standpoint of the ordinary usage of language' ([18] p. 216), or why he needs it for defining the concept of a sentential function ( [18] p. 217).
Tarski also states a 'general law', [18] p. 217. The appropriate translation of his general law into our setting is not entirely clear. But it seems to imply that each head expression lies on the righthand side of exactly one context-free rule (at least for those rules which have a category of formulas on the left).
Tarski also discusses several problems that arise if one tries to weaken the category regime. It certainly does look as if one should be able to relax his category restrictions a good deal, but I have nothing systematic to say about this. §4. Frege's contribution. What should we credit to Frege in all this?
Frege's main writings on the foundations of mathematics were complete before Husserl's Fourth Investigation appeared. So Frege has none of Husserl's category analysis. Nevertheless some of Frege's most telling points get a sharper edge through being put in category terms.
In the first place, it was Frege in his On Sense and Reference [5] who pointed out the difficulties that it causes for the semantics of a language if we introduce 'believe' and other words that express states of mind. One consequence that Frege himself could not have drawn is the following. If φ and ψ are sentences with the same meaning, then Proposition 2 implies that the two sentences Walter Mitty believes that φ. Walter Mitty believes that ψ.
have the same content in any fregean cover. So Frege's Dictum is incompatible with possible world semantics on sentences (and more generally with any semantics that gives the same value to all necessary truths), since there are people who believe some necessary truths but not others. At the meeting in Munich there was some discussion of the fact that Frege's mature notion of Sinn can't be cashed in terms of truth in possible worlds. I'm happy to report, on the basis of the observation above, that the same is already true of Frege's notion of Sinn in the Grundlagen.
One way of looking at Frege's examples in On Sense and Reference is to observe that two expressions which have the same meaning in a satisfactory semantics for L may have to be given distinct meanings in a satisfactory semantics for a language L extending L-specifically if L adds to L the verb 'believe' and tenses on verbs. The same seems to be true for categories, and the quotation from Harris above hints at this: two expressions that have the same category in L may have different categories in L . For a husserlian semantics, this forces the two expressions to have different meanings in L too. For example a language might contain the two synonymous verbs 'gave' and 'donated'. Add a few standard words to the language and we have the pair
We gave the school some books. We donated the school some books.
In the expanded language, a husserlian semantics must give different meanings to 'gave' and 'donated'. This doesn't seem to be a case that allows easy remedies like those in Remark 2 above. The moral is that fregean covers can be very unstable under extension of the language.
Second, Frege in his book Begriffschrift [6] (1879) introduced a language, also called Begriffschrift, which has a context-free grammar, unique parsing and a flat head system (again counting quantifiers as unanalysable). This statement doesn't quite make sense, because the formulas of Begriffschrift are trees rather than strings. Frege's problem was that he invented too much at once, and by inventing Begriffschrift he also invented phrase markers. Let me develop this a little.
In Germany in the nineteenth century, language teachers sometimes used tree diagrams to explain the parsing of a sentence. These diagrams were not exactly precision instruments, as one can see from the following example of Billroth [2] And here we recall that Frege's father Karl Alexander Frege was a language teacher-though there is no evidence that he used diagrams of this type.
In the language Begriffschrift, Frege's head expressions are material implication, negation, relation symbols (including identity) and universal quantifier. In general he forms compound expressions by writing their head at the top and then lines to the right or downwards pointing to the non-head constituents. (Relation symbols are the exception; his syntax for these is the conventional one.) This would cause problems if head expressions were compound, but in Begriffschrift they never are.
The more familiar Chomsky-style phrase markers are essentially the trees of inclusion of constituents. They have no distinguished head symbols, and the symbol at a nonterminal node is a category symbol rather than an expression of the language. Frege's phrase markers, with the head expressions at nonterminal nodes, are closer to Lucien Tesnière's 'stemmata' ( [19] p. 14f). Also Frege's phrase markers branch out from top left rather than top centre, but this is a triviality.
Frege doesn't have a name for 'head expression', and it is only in the Grundgesetze [4] of 1893 that he brings his various head expressions together under one roof. There he explains that each head expression expresses a function; he has to develop the notion of a function in order to explain ( §21) how this is true for the universal quantifier.
In a more usual syntax, Frege would have written his head symbols to the left or the right of their argument expressions, or maybe between them. We can imagine them so written, and then Frege's language becomes one that we can apply the notions of this paper to. Frege holds that each compound expression f is got by combining one of his head symbols, say h, with a string e 1 . . . e n of non-head expressions. Here h names a function, and f names the result of applying this function to whatever the expressions e 1 , . . . , e n are names for (Grundgesetze §1).
Of course this anticipates Proposition 6 above. It seems to be a highly original view. Looking back through the history of western linguistics, the only comparable earlier theory of syntactic composition seems to be that of the thirteenth and fourteenth century Modists. According to them, each compound expression is a binary combination of a 'dependens' expression (the head?) and a 'terminans' expression. N (a, b) . In our terminology, 'number' is an expression of head category which combines with other expressions to form a sentence. It seems to me not unreasonable to sum up this achievement by saying that it is enough to look for the meanings of sentences of the form N (a, b) , because this will yield the meaning of 'number'.
Granted, this is not exactly what the Dictum says. In particular the Dictum seems to be about all the constituents of any sentence, not just words of head category. In the particular place where Frege utters the Dictum, he is defending his thesis against the possible objection that it supplies no mental picture of a number. His point is that you can define any word with a suitable sentence containing the word; you don't have to give a picture. In the Grundgesetze §33 Frege takes this point much deeper and separates it completely from psychological irrelevances. What he does-and I believe he is the first to do it-is to describe canonical forms for the sentences used to define symbols of various categories.
